Cant Resist An Urge To Temporally Act As That Annoying Individual Who Wants To Intervene Just Because

Can’t resist an urge to temporally act as that annoying individual who wants to intervene just because “what about 19th century men depicted in the exact same manner and are there even any at all” ?

It seems especially relevant after our recent visit to the State Historical Museum, where we were lucky enough to locate a portrait which suits the theme of “an empire-styled person with the harp” perfectly. ✨

It’s a portrait of a young gentleman drawn in 1801 by the Austrian portraitist Ludwig Guttenbrunn (1750 - 1819).

One of their many protégés, he worked for a while for the most prominent Hungarian dynasty in the Habsburg’s monarchy, Esterházy de Galántha, then travelled and studied a lot in Italy and England, until in 1795, on the recommendation of the Russian envoy in London, he moved to Saint Petersburg and later to Moscow.

Through years he was able to depict a fair amount of Russian noblemen and women, including this charming young man, Nikolay Mikhailovich Gusyatnikov, who originated from a wealthy family of merchants, highly regarded in Moscow, and lately became the first one in his family to be elevated to the noble dignity thanks to his military service.

Women playing the harp during the Napoleonic era, early 19th century

The Shopping Arcade des Panoramas in Paris, 1807 by Philibert Louis Debucourt

the children of Maria Theresa of Austria and Francis I, Holy Roman Emperor

Ohhhh, for sure! 💕

*hugs back tightly*

Part 2 of 3

Oh my, oh my, what can I say, when it comes to Klemens’ lovely correspondence…

First and foremost, Metternich wrote so much in his lifetime that it’s nearly impossible to estimate the scales of his soaring thought (how far was he carried away in the process - that’s another great question for a lifetime)! As much of his literary heritage has been published, as much is already gone or still hidden from the public eye in the dens of various archives and private collections. Thanks to the efforts of his son, Richard, and other publishers, we can, at least, enjoy a few selections of his private correspondence. However, it was only a tip of an iceberg, for sure. 😅

Since I’m not that interested in Klemens’ perception of Napoleon and his politics, I can’t add much (although you can’t escape this topic, if you start learning about him - Metternich’s whole life was haunted by the presence of the great man ™️ and he couldn’t get rid of it, especially in the 1850s, when to the upcoming generation [or simply more successful politicians of his own age, ehem] he was mostly valuable because of his claims about understanding Napoleon’s “true nature”) …

Perhaps, an acknowledgment of some sort suffices: even though Klemens wasn’t good at foreseeing political trends - the future itself, he definitely possessed an instinct for people. He was a man of his time after all, cultivated, deeply sensitive and receptive, who craved to understand human nature thoroughly both from physiological and psychological points of view. His judgements may seem overly pretentious in some cases but he got to the bottom of things rather well, in my opinion.

In addition, I translated some passages from the Metternich’s biography I love with all my heart, since the author gives a much more comprehensive opinion on the subject there. I do not proclaim those notions as an ultimate truth but I still find his train of thought intriguing. 👀

Intensive personal interactions with Napoleon were for Klemens much more important than official negotiations. Not a single love affair, not a single political event, perhaps, with the exception of the French Revolution, influenced him as much and deeply as these many hours of conversations, often face-to-face, with the most grandiose personality of the era. In Klemens’ dispatches to Franz there are mentions of three- and four-hour-long conversations. He had reason to assert that hardly any of the non-Frenchmen had communicated with Napoleon as long and as directly as he had. "Conversations with him," wrote Metternich later in his portrayal of Napoleon, "have always been full of charm which I find difficult to explain. He outlined the most essential things for him in the subject, discarding unnecessary details, developing his thought clearly and precisely, always finding or coming up with the most appropriate words. These conversations have always been extremely fascinating".

…It is easier to understand Metternich's interest in Napoleon than the French emperor's interest in the Austrian minister. Undoubtedly, Metternich was a brilliant conversationalist – witty, well-informed in politics, with a decent knowledge of natural sciences. But that's not the main point. An explanation can be found in Balzac, who subtly noticed an important trait in Napoleon's character: "Victories over the aristocracy often flattered the emperor's self-esteem no less than the battles won”.

Communication with Metternich, his enticement was for Napoleon one of the forms of self-affirmation in the monarchical-aristocratic world. And it should be noted that he managed to achieve success, although it can be compared with one of his passing victories and not with Austerlitz. The theme "Metternich and Napoleon" is no less interesting psychologically than politically.

Metternich about Napoleon, 1808

An interesting evaluation of the general situation in France, from autumn 1808, given by Austrian ambassador Metternich to his Minister of Foreign Affairs in Vienna, taken from the second volume of “Mémoires, documents et écrits divers”. For context: Metternich had in an earlier missive suggested it might be a good idea to have closer relations with Talleyrand. A suggestion that – hardly surprising – seems to have met with lots of suspicion in Vienna. Metternich tries to prove that, for once, Talleyrand is not to be seen as an enemy to the Austrian cause, that he, to the contrary, tries to stabilize a foreign policy that is about to spiral out of control.

Metternich to Stadion. Paris, 24 September 1808

[…] There are two parties in France, as opposed to each other as the interests of Europe are to the particular ideas of the Emperor.

At the head of one is the Emperor and all the military. The first only wants to extend his influence by means of force, and it is from a degree of nepotism of which there is perhaps no example, a feeling at least as strong in him as egoism; it is, moreover, from the bellicose tendency which a long habit has given to his mind, and from the fiery spirit of his character, to which we owe all the upheavals which, contrary to all reason, and to all sound and settled political calculation, he attempts and unfortunately executes only too much every year.

In short: The guy is unable to discipline himself, and unlike at other courts, there currently is no system in place to keep him in check by other means.

Napoleon sees in France only himself; in Europe and in the whole world, only his family. It is enough to observe him, against all prudence, isolating himself from all the members of his family in order to place them far from him on thrones acquired at the price of so much blood and sacrifice, to see him overthrow weak princes, entirely subject to his will, even to his whims, in order to give these crowns to brothers or relatives over whom he exercises infinitely less influence, - a truth proven daily, to his great chagrin, - not to be able to doubt that his very ambition is subject to his inclination for nepotism.

As interesting and probably correct this assessment by Metternich is (the problems Napoleon had before he took over Portugal and Spain are miniscule compared to those he had after that coup), I could imagine there may be an ulterior motive behind Metternich’s dire warning of nepotism. After all, the Austrian emperor, too, had plenty of brothers, and so had empress Maria Ludovica, most of which were no friends of Metternich.

Personally, I think there may be another motive behind Napoleon’s behaviour than nepotism. As Metternich states himself, Napoleon often struggled to keep his relatives in check. So, when he removed them from Paris and put them on thrones far away, did he do that only in order to do them a favour, or also in order to strengthen his own position in France by removing anyone who might become a figurehead of opposition at home? He removed, one by one:

Eugène (son of the empress, closest thing to a son Napoleon had in the eyes of the public during the Consulate)

Joseph (most respected and most influential of his brothers, according to the constitution his immediate heir)

Louis (father to the boy whom most people saw as Napoleon’s likely future heir)

Jérome (last remaining of his brothers)

Murat (last remaining and highest-ranking family member still in Paris, most respected in the army among all the relatives)

While Lucien of course famously had exiled himself even before the empire. - From what I have read about other courts, it was not unusual to see people flock around other influential figures than the monarch, especially around a possible heir, forming different parties in more or less overt opposition to each other and to certain policies. While it made a court a hotbet for intrigues, it also made it possible for different views and attitudes to coexist there, and to confront the monarch with them. I often feel like Napoleon was keen on removing his relatives from court simply because it removed a source of possible opposition.

Metternich continues:

The military seek only bruises and wounds, especially since he who escapes death is sure of immense rewards.

This must have made for interesting battlefield conversations: Excuse me, sir, before I kill you off, could be so kind as to wound me a little? Nothing too serious, if you please, but with lots of blood. I finally want that damned cross, you know.

There is only one state in France which opens the way to everything, to fortune, to titles, to the constant protection of the Sovereign: it is the military state; one would say that France is populated solely by soldiers and by citizens created to serve it by the sweat of their brow.

The other party is composed of the great mass of the nation, an inert and immovable mass, like the remains of an extinct volcano. At the head of this mass are the most eminent persons of the civil state, and principally M. de Talleyrand, the Minister of Police, and all those who have fortunes to keep, who see no stability in institutions based on ruins, and which, rather than leaning on a durable state of affairs, the anxious genius of the Emperor surrounds only with new ruins.

I’m not sure if Metternich is right in drawing such a clear line between these two parties, to me the distinction seems much more blurry. Plenty of high-ranking officers had married into the circles “who have fortunes to keep”, after all. And there are lots of reports about unrest in the army already from the Polish campaign in 1807. The alleged “Philadelphes” conspiracy is mentioned a lot in German sources for the campaign of 1809, for what those are worth.

This party has existed since 1805; the war of 1806 and 1807 strengthened its means; the bad success of the enterprise against Spain in 1808 made the leaders of the party and their arguments popular; what previous successes had not been able to mitigate had to be strengthened by reverses caused by the most disastrous and immoral of calculations.

This last expression probably refers to the coup in Spain and Napoleon forcing the Bourbons to abdicate so he could put Joseph on the Spanish throne. Which, in my opinion, was not only immoral but mostly clumsy and stupid.

It is in the nature of things that two parties directly opposed can only gain strength at the expense of each other. The reverses in Spain, the destruction of several army corps, the reflux into the interior of troops sustained and fed up to now at the expense of foreigners; the drying up of a host of pecuniary resources, the upheaval given to France by the passage of so many columns which cross it in all directions, all these facts, combined with a hundred other considerations, have weakened the party of universal destruction and strengthened, consequently, the party of interior consolidation, which is only composed of elements equally protective of us.

That’s mostly interesting to me because it alludes to the pecuniary problems Napoleon faced around that very time (or actually always during periods of peace): His army simply was way, WAY too big and a constant drain on France’s finances, even counting the enormous war recompensations the defeated enemies usually had to pay. The Bourbons on returning to France will in the end have to solve that problem that Napoleon merely dragged out as long as he could. But he was very aware of it and tried to find reasons to keep as many troops outside of France as possible, where they had to be provided for and paid by the host country.

I’m not sure if Metternich is necessarily right in everything but he was a diplomat by trade and likely to correctly evaluate his sources. Overall, it’s an interesting assessment of France’s true situation around the time of the congress of Erfurt, and before Napoleon’s Spanish campaign.